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TOWNS OF
THE WESTERN RAILROADS

JOHN C. HUDSON

of frame houses, followed always by store
buildings, churches, elevators, a crossing where
somebody stood waiting, then a depot, followed by more houses, and fmally back to open
fields again, all encountered in a flash, quickly
blurred in the memory by so many others like
it already passed.
Day and night, these towns along the western railroads kept a rhythm that was interrupted only when one of them was important
enough to command the train to stop: La
Junta, Glendive, or McCook might be observed
more carefully, but hundreds of others were
only glimpses, unremembered and unremarkable, except in their predictable appearance
and disappearance, mile after mile. They made
an impression collectively, not as individual
places. Their similarities were noted far more
than their differences, not only by those who
passed through them quickly and in succession,
but also by those who knew them individually
and up close. Railroad towns were far more
numerous than most people realized, and the
story of how they became such a fIXture of
the landscape requires more than the simple,
functional explanation that they were necessary.

From Chicago it is more than twenty-two
hundred miles overland to any of the great
cities of the Pacific Coast. For almost a century
those who made this crossing traveled by train.
If they chose to watch, and most did, they saw
a three-day pageant of plain, mountain, and
desert as it unfolded, hour after hour, across
their view from the train window. The high
point of the drama might have been an early
evening view of Glacier Park, a crossing of the
Great salt Lake at dawn, or a midday climb
over Glorieta, but the thousands who saw the
West this way brought home other memories,
too.
With a regularity that even the most disinterested traveler must have come to expect by
journey's end, the pageant was diverted every
few minutes by the fast approach through
swirling dust and raining cinders of a neat row
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BACKGROUND

As the transcontinental railways stretched
west in the 1860s and '70s, "every temporary
terminus of track laying became a city, wicked,
wonderful, and short-lived." A former railroad
agent wrote in Harper's Magazine of one such
place at the end of track in western Kansas.
The town of Coyote consisted of "canvas
saloons, sheet-iron hotels, and sod dwellings,
surrounded by tin cans and scattered playing
cards" j its principal street, known as "Rat
Row," was temporary home for a gang of Irish
track laborers whose behavior was set forth in
shocking detail. The writer held that "the
Pacific railways have been responsible for more
and worse towns than any other single cause.',1
From the start, the railroad towns were
condemned for their unimaginative design.
"Dropped at random upon the flat and featureless prairies along our western railroads," the
new towns were predicted to be failures. "In
the ordinary course of civilization, such characterless sites are not the ones to which populations cleave," wrote a typically harsh critic
in the American Architect and Building News. 2
To make matters worse, these blots on the
record of city planning, these squalid shantytowns inhabited by ruffians, were the personal
creations of railroad builders and their cronies,
everyone's favorite symbols of greed and corruption in that Gilded Age. 3
The towns themselves were symbols of a
necessary step in the westward march of
civilization. Along with some of the other less
prosaic aspects of pioneering, they shocked the
educated and the refined, but they were absolutely irresistable to others, and it was no time
before a steady stream of young men and
women began appearing on the muddy townsites to dicker for choice building lots in the
grid of wooden stakes that poked up through
the trampled prairie grass. The scene was reenacted thousands of times, in thousands of
places.
Some of the towns grew to become important cities. Tacoma, Reno, Fresno, Cheyenne, Billings, and Albuquerque are successful

examples, but even a list of half a dozen requires some qualification because there is no
suitably restrictive defmition of a "railroad
town" that would allow counting their numbers. 4 Every sizable town, east or west, was
served by a railroad before the end of the nineteenth century. On the other hand, very few
settlements actually were owned by railroads
after the fashion of company towns of that
period.
What distinguishes a railroad town is that it
was part of a railroad's strategy to populate and
control the territory along its line. Successful
or not, a railroad town was a component of
corporate ambitions to manipulate people and
resources, to command space and consolidate
position, in order to maximize profits for the
company. Hundreds of independent towns
sprang up along the tracks, but they were not
instruments of corporate strategy. Countless
other towns were in place before railroads
arrived, and sometimes they were successful
in bringing the rails their way, but in neither
of these cases could the railroad develop
the full potential of a townsite for its own
advantage.
The first railroad towns appeared east of the
Mississippi River before 1860. The spread of
new railroads was curtailed sharply by the Civil
War, but construction resumed shortly thereafter. The nation's first transcontinental line
(Union Pacific-Central Pacific) was completed
during a building cycle that peaked in 1871.
Western railroad construction was at a standstill from 1873 to 1878, but this was followed
by two periods of rapid growth between 1879
and 1890, when most of the rest of the transcontinental network was begun. A fmal spurt
of construction in the first decade of the
twentieth century completed the pattern. S
Railroad towns were founded according to this
same tempo of boom-bust cycles, and not as a
steady, westward spread so often portrayed as
typical of the advancing population frontier.
From 1850 to 1910, these new towns were
staked out across the nation. In the West, where
few cities had existed before, they became the
fabric of the settlement system.
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TOWN DEVELOPMENT

The railroads' clear purpose in developing
townsites was to promote and control business
along the line. Every railroad that promoted
agricultural settlement also tried to lure prospective business people to their new towns.
There was little disagreement over how the
system should perform: farmers expected that
trade-center towns would be created, merchants
expected that there would be a surrounding
population to support the trade, and railroads
did their part by replicating in the West that
system of town-country settlement familiar
to Americans. Some railroad towns were
created in nonagricultural areas, but the majority of places were designed to be nothing more
()l' less than trade centers. While anyone might
promote business growth in towns along the
line, the railroads had an interest in controlling
it by limiting the number of stations. A regular
spacing, at seven- to ten-mile intervals, discouraged subsequent entries by independent
promoters.
Many railroads entered into agreements with
private parties who platted and sold the townsites. Railroad survey engineers determined
town locations and then turned over their data
to townsite agents, who hired surveyors (sometimes from the railroad) to stake out the plat.
There was no shortage of men who wanted to
get into the business, especially during the
boom periods of westward migration, but there
was little chance for most of them. Railroads
generally placed responsibility for all the townsites on a line in the hands of one man, or a
small group, and those chosen were already
connected financially with the road. James J.
Hill of the Great Northern Railway insisted
that his company did not engage in this business, but Hill nonetheless had a substantial
investment of his own money in several townsite companies that appeared to be independent
of his railroad. Such an arrangement was
common.
The greatest of all the western townsite
creators was General Grenville M. Dodge, who
had charge of the Union Pacific's towns in the

late 1860s and later, with his son-in-law, R. E.
Montgomery, directed townsites for the Texas
& Pacific and the Fort Worth & Denver City.
Dodge was in charge, although there is little
evidence that he ever became well acquainted
with his creations.
It was General Dodge who claimed credit
for influencing President Abraham Lincoln to
choose the Union Pacific route west from
Council Bluffs for the nation's first transcontinental line. When Dodge left the army in
1866, he immediately became chief engineer
for the Union Pacific. That same year he was
elected to Congress from the western district
of Iowa, and in May, 1867, he was appointed
agent in charge of Union Pacific townsites. 6
Dodge directed railroad operations from
Washington, where his presence and his reputation clearly benefited the Union Pacific. He
repeatedly requested, and was granted, the
presence of cavalry units to protect construction gangs in Nebraska and Wyoming. He prevailed upon Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton
to urge a prohibition of the sale of whiskey in
the vicinity of Union Pacific construction.
Dodge knowingly had the city of Laramie,
Wyoming, platted on the grounds of a United
States military reservation (Fort Sanders) "for
the protection of our property and the people
connected with our enterprise," and then
persuaded General William Tecumseh Sherman
to approve it. 7
In 1884, when he and Montgomery were
involved in Texas townsites, Dodge sold the
government land for military posts along the
route of construction, and then used his influence to rearrange military operations so as to
protect his investment. As a recent biographer
noted, "Dodge's favorite occupation was anything that made money, irrespective of whether
it were ethical or permanent.,,8 No other man
simultaneously commanded the attention of
eastern railroad investors, the United States
government, and local officials as Dodge could.
He was atypical of townsite agents also in his
ability to direct opertions he rarely, if ever,
saw. Cheyenne, Laramie, Midland, and Odessa
were some of his creations, but most of his
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towns, like those platted by others, never
achieved more than a modest success.
Possession of a land grant was more than
enough to entice a railroad to promote townsites. The Illinois Central Railroad, for example,
the first to receive such a grant, was forbidden
by its charter from engaging in the town
business. The Illinois Central may have set the
pattern for later years, however, by creating
the Associates Land Company, an organization led by some of the directors of the railroad, which platted and sold town lots around
the railroad's stations in Illinois. 9
There is evidence of direct borrowing on
the experience of earlier lines, and this may
account for some of the uniformity in townsite practices among railroads. In 1868 General
Dodge sent a Union Pacific official, O. F. Davis,
to visit the land departments of the Illinois
Central and the Cedar Rapids & Missouri River.
Davis examined both operations closely and
made recommendations to Dodge on the strong
points of each, an indication that the Union
Pacific had not then decided how to market
its land and town lots. 10 In addition, men with
townsite experience on one road often hired
out to companies just entering the business,
and this succession moved the townsite strategies from company to company as lines were
built west.
Outside parties were prohibited by law from
creating townsites within the limits of the
Union Pacific's land grant before it was surveyed, but not after. In order to be sure of getting desirable locations, the railroad had to
select townsites ahead of the land survey, but
in so doing they had no way of knowing if the
tracts so selected were on their (odd-numbered)
sections or not. Dodge called it "a singular
streak of fortune" that "with one or two exceptions the towns are now on odd sections."
Until the land grant was considered earned,
however, the company could not give more
than quit-claim deeds to town lots on its own
sections. Grand Island, Nebraska, was platted
partly on UP land and partly on a school section purchased by the railroad. The company
was able to issue general warranty deeds on

the school section but not on the odd section, a condition that skewed Grand Island's
early development away from the railroad
grant. 11
While land grants encouraged townsite
development, lines built without such aid probably generated just as many new towns. The
promoter needed to sell only a few choice
corner lots in order to recover his investment.
The principal risk was the inevitable slump in
lot sales that took place after the buyers'
attention had shifted to the next new town
down the tracks. If the town plat was too large
in relation to demand, unsold lots became a
burden in later years because of the annual
property taxes that had to be paid on each lot.
More than one railroad official tried to devise
a means for vacating portions of a plat in order
to avoid taxes. Most companies cut short their
losses by selling all the remaining lots to a single
buyer, or else they vacated those blocks in
which no sales had been made. 12
A shift of emphasis in the townsite business
occurred after the transcontinentals had been
built across country; any new construction
after that consisted of shorter branches or
secondary lines designed to serve territory,
rather than bridge it. As the network of railroad lines grew more weblike, companies
began to vie with one another for the interstitial trade, and in some cases the competition
was intense. 13 When the railroad builder
had his eye on the horizon, he was less interested in adding more trade-center towns along
his line, but when he was in the business of
capturing trade, he packed in as many towns
as he could in order to soak up as much produce of the rural hinterlands as possible. As a
result, the number of new railroad towns
increased, rather than decreased, after the
transcontinental lines had been completed.
The timing was as bad as it could have been.
This strategy placed on the market hundreds
of new trade-center towns with diminished
prospects for rural business just when forces
outside the system were dictating hard times
for towns that did not already have an established clientele.
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IDEOLOGY

The railroad town was a Yankee invention.
Some of its formative influences stemmed
directly from the sources of railroad investment. New York and especially Boston sank
far more of their investment capital in the
western railroads than did Philadelphia, Baltimore, or any other major city .14 The idea of
building railroads west of the Berkshires, west
of the Alleghenies, west of the Great Lakes,
and fmally west of the Mississippi held a strong
appeal for the young men of New England and
upstate New York, and they came west to take
part in one venture after another. These early
western railroad builders were educated in
engineering or in business, steeped in Yankee
traditions of commerce, and eager to establish
themselves financially in the new emporia of
the West. 1S
Philadelphia is acknowledged to be the birthplace of urban land speculation on this continent, and railroad towns saw plenty of it, but
it was not Philadelphia's influence, its money,
or its citizens that shaped western railroad
towns. It was in New England and New York
that the custom of formally platting a settlement, no matter what the size or purpose, had
become accepted by 1820, and it was into this
milieu that the western railroad builders were
born. A grid of streets-though it might have
been an irregular one-with building lots of
various sizes and extra-wide avenues for important thoroughfares, all done up in a neat, compact layout, was as Northern as an informal
arrangement of stores and houses at a crossroads was typically Southern. New England's
town settlements had not begun this way, and
the southern colonies had some elegant urban
designs, but these early traditions did not
prevail past colonial times.
The first decades of the nineteenth century
witnessed what has been described as "an or~
of town platting" in western New York. 6
Later, a similar orgy took place in Ohio, where
a prescient territorial legislature had passed
a law in 1800 requiring that town plats be
filed with county recorder's offices. By 1878,

fifteen other states and territories had passed
such a law; only two of them were south of the
Ohio River. 17 The idea that towns had to be
platted to be real was fumly entrenched in the
Northern mind, and along with that went the
idea of selling lots on a checkerboard to energetic businesspeople who would make an effort
to boost the town.
The Civil War injected another heavy dose
of Northern influence into railroad building
throughout the West. In his memoirs, General
Dodge frankly acknowledged that "the construction of the Union Pacific was upon a military basis." The heads of the engineering parties
and all the construction chiefs had been officers
in the war. 1S More than that, the Civil War,
with its difficult logistical problems, had been
a training ground for young men who found
themselves thereby possessed of engineering
skills that were in great demand by the new
railroads in the West. Northern money and
Northern men thus came to dominate the railroads and their towns from Canada to the
Gulf. Western railroad towns reflected this
influence.
The creation of a townsite was only the
fust phase in a company's economic strategy.
Railroad towns also had to be sold, which
meant that prospective buyers had to be found,
sent to the right places, and urged to bid on
property. Townsite agents thus became information brokers as well, responding to inquiries
from merchants, lawyers, doctors, newspapermen, and a host of others who were seeking
profitable business locations. Knowledgeable
agents could suggest whether a given town
might support several general stores, one or
two hardware stores, one newspaper, and two
livery stables; or whether another might support twice that many, in the same ratio. The
formulas used to make such calculations were,
in effect, folk location theories-preconceptions
that anyone familiar with trade-center towns of
the Middle West or the Northeast might have
carried in his head.
Townsite agents broke with tradition in one
important respect. Since each business needed
a building lot, the way to produce more lot

46 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, WINTER 1982

sales was to encourage more businesses, limited
in size, each specializing in fewer lines of trade
than had been the custom up to that time.
General stores were welcome, but shoe stores,
harness shops, confectioneries, oyster houses,
and dry goods merchants were even better. The
result was an expanded business population not
warranted by the trade to be had.
When railroad officials referred to "colonization," they were almost always speaking of
their efforts to recruit farm settlers. Townsite
promotions also involved recruiting people,
but these operations generally were handled by
a separate department of the railroad or by
afHliates who did not draw a salary from the
company at all. This division in railroad promotion efforts reflected a strong ethnic and class
bias held by railroad management, and it was a
division to be replicated in the settlements
themselves.
Carl B. Schmidt, who was once commissioner of, foreign immigration in the land department of the Santa Fe Railroad, reminisced in
his later years about how he had brought the
wheat-raising Mennonites to Kansas. Then a
successful businessman in Pueblo, Colorado,
Schmidt was worried about the future supply
of foreign -labor: "The fruit growers in the
Pacific Coast states already complain that their
Chinamen are ... getting too old to work; with
no new Chinamen coming in, who is to take
their place to prevent the orchards from becoming unprofitable and ruined?" In the Pueblo
smelters, he said, "the men who do the rough,
hard work are the Slavs and the Italians, while
native Americans hold the positions of foremen, engineers, and other high places, in which
the brain and the tongue are more essential
than muscle.,,19 Schmidt, an immigrant himself, was not alone in his view that certain races
and nationalities were especially suited to backbreaking toil on farms and in factories. The
land departments of nearly all western roads
sought immigrants, especially from the nonEnglish-speaking countries of northern Europe,
in the belief that they would work harder, complain less, and produce more than anyone else.
The approach was altogether different when

it came to recruiting merchants. The immigration agents from competing railroads who
fought each other over the Russian-German
Mennonite wheat farmers would not have
thought of enticing such people, or any others
they perceived as peasants, to open up a store
on a railroad townsite. Towns were for the
native-born and educated; railroad officials
perceived merchants to be such a class of
people, who would somehow, immediately,
through their brains and thrift, produce a
prosperous town, just as the hard-working
farmers beyond the city limits would begin
producing bumper crops of grain. The picture
was static, with no room for change, except
for the type of growth that maintained the
same pattern.
TOWN PLANNING

platting towns as a grid of streets demarcating blocks to be divided into building lots
was an idea firmly established long before railroad companies took up real estate as a sideline. The subject often is discussed in terms of
land speculation and paper towns. That is a
useful perspective on the motivations of many
who boomed western townsites, but the emphasis is slightly misplaced in the case of railroad
men. They entered this business as much to
control town development as to profit from it.
Their strategy was to eliminate, in effect, all
but a few acres out of each hundred square
miles as possible locations to do business. The
railroad's instrument of control was the townsite plat.
plats brought back from the field by survey
engineers and recorded in the county courthouses were not undifferentiated, checkerboard
designs. Each plat contained many visual cues
as to how the town should develop. Residential
lots, six to the blockface, were 50 feet wide.
Anyone who looked at the official plat knew
that the 25-foot lots were for businesses and
that streets lined with these narrow lots would
be in the business district. The most important
streets were 80 or 100 feet wide, and buyers
knew that the principal intersection would be
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where two streets of this width crossed. Residential streets were 60 feet wide, and alleys
(generally thought desirable at that time) were
20 feet. 20 The streets were named on the plat,
but the names were less important than the
visual cues. The corner of Main Street and First
Avenue might or might not have been the best
location in town; it depended on the width of
the streets and the arrangement and sizes of
lots.
In the early years all lots were sold over the
counter at fIxed, predetermined prices by resident agents of the railroad. It was soon learned,
however, that an opening-day auction sale drew
more attention because bidders knew they had
to be there early and go high for those four
choice corner lots, and that is where the auctioneer generally began his sale.
There was considerable variety in railroad
town plats even within the rigid grid pattern
they all followed. The earliest idea, and one
popularized by the Illinois Central Associates,
was a parallel arrangement with the railroad
track as the axis of symmetry (Fig. 1).21 The
prototype is hard to discern, but it was commonplace for businesses to face the artery of
commerce, whether that was a road, a canal,
or a waterfront; perhaps the railroads were imitating that layout. The arrangement created
two business streets, with buildings facing

each other across 300 feet of railroad rightof-way. The wide strip was designed for elevators, coal yards, and other businesses that
needed direct access to the railroad. This land
was underused, and some towns eventually
acquired a portion of it for parks. It was rare
to see both railroad-facing business streets
developed equally; if First Avenue North was
the major concentration, then First Avenue
South became the "other side of the tracks"
with a row of saloons and cheap hotels. It
proved unreasonable to assume that the business district would develop as a single unit
where there was a strip of land the length of a
football fIeld separating its two halves (Fig. 2).
Placing businesses on both sides of the same
street made better sense, and this arrangement
soon gained favor. The most common solution
was to have the business street cross the railroad tracks at an angle, so that only one crossing was required between the two parts of the
commercial district (Fig. 1).22 The railroad,
with its strip of elevators alongside, bisected
Main Street; the form was orthogonal. The
depot generally was placed near this crossing,
in the middle of the plat. Nevertheless, towns
continued to develop more on one side of the
tracks than on the other, and the orthogonal
plan soon evolved to its fInal phase, the T-town
(Fig. 1).

T-TOWN

FIG. 1. The changing form of the railroad town. Symmetric plats were the earliest, and they
were succeeded by the orthogonal form, which in turn was replaced by the T-town variety.
The types exhibit no clear geographical variation, however. See footnotes 21, 22, and 23
for examples.
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platting were a response to practice, not planning; they reflected the gradual process of readjustment and realignment made by the residents
themselves. The T-town was a railroad innovation that simply confirmed what had been
happening anyway.
TOWN BUILDING

FlG. 2. Land along the tracks in a symmetric
town was intended for businesses that needed
access to the railroad (top: Farina, Illinois).
In some cases the business district faced the
tracks across a narrow park (bottom: Rock
Springs, Wyoming).

The T-town was a stable solution, more
acceptable to the railroad and to townspeople
(Fig. 3). It came into vogue in the final phases
of railroad building, in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, when railroad towns
were built mainly along branch and feeder
lines in the United States, but it was dominant
in the Canadian West, where the railroad building phases came into sequence about two decades later. 23
These progressive stages in the refinement of
townsite design gradually removed the railroad
from its position as a town's centerpiece. In
the first shift, parallelism was replaced by
orthogonality; in the second, symmetry was
replaced by asymmetry. The trends in town

Just as the two-dimensional railroad town
developed according to a few commonly shared
_ ideas, the same was true of the third dimension
as buildings and other material improvements
started to appear. Some places took on a ragged
lool:c from the start because of the railroad's
clumsy attempts at land speculation. The Union
Pacific followed the idea of selling every other
24-foot business lot at a bargain price and withholding the rest from sale until lot prices had
been bid up. Their man in Laramie suggested,
quite reasonably, that some prospective buyers
might want two adjacent lots in order to construct wider buildings, but the company did not
allow such sales. 24 The 24-foot restriction guaranteed that buildings would be small and that
the businesses occupying them also would be
small and specialized. Some of the Northern
Pacific's towns were developed jointly with
syndicates that owned every other lot (none
adjacent) on the townsite. The syndicate men
naturally pushed their own lots, while the railroad did little to sell theirs. 25 The result, again,
was to spread the business district over a much
larger area than was necessary and to create a
townsite dotted with small buildings.
One effect of these restrictions was that
most business buildings were similar in size and
shape. This meant that when one business went
under and the proprietor wanted to sell out, he
had little difficulty in fmding a buyer, no
matter what use the new owner had in mind.
Small buildings were moved easily, and it was
common for a single structure to occupy more
than one location and serve more than one
function in its lifetime. 26 This pattern persisted
in towns that saw little new investment after
the early boom years. A trickle of new businesses slowly filled in most of the gaps, creating

FIG. 3. Main Street in the T-town begins at the railroad tracks, generally at a row of elevators (top: High Prairie, Alberta) or at the depot (middle: Clovis, New Mexico). Public
buildings often mark the horizon at the end of the street (bottom: Judith Basin County
Courthouse, Stanford, Montana).

FIG. 4. Business rows. Gaps along Main Street characterize towns that attracted little new
capital investment after the early boom years (top: Colman, South Dakota). Minor variations
in store fronts give the appearance of variety, although most business buildings were of a
single size and shape (middle: Butte, Nebraska). Larger business blocks are hallmarks of
towns that benefited from continued investment (bottom: Anadarko, Oklahoma).
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a street lined with small buildings of various
heights, but fires and business failures took
their toll in later years, and the gap-toothed
look returned to Main Street. Towns that
escaped this syndrome were fortunate to have a
few aggressive entrepreneurs of some means
who tore down the original structures and replaced them with larger business blocks; those
towns are the ones surviving today as trade
centers (Fig. 4).
Although small buildings were a pervasive
feature of all railroad towns, there was a distinct, regional architectural variation among
them. A North Dakota Main Street was virtually a corridor between two walls of bare-faced,
false-front buildings, set high, above snow
depth. Farther south, the horizontal dimension
took over, false fronts were shallower, the
storefront was sheltered by a canopy over the
sidewalk, and the floors tended to be closer to
street level. Brick and stone were unusual,
except for banks, in the Dakotas and Montana,
frequent in Nebraska and Kansas, and dominant
in Oklahoma and Texas. Such variations are
not, of course, confmed to towns created by
the railroads, nor do they reflect anything so
much as well-known regional preferences and
climatic adaptations in building design that
moved in parallel streams, from east to west,
along with the people (Fig. 5).
Most townsite proprietors realized that they
had to bend a little in order to build up a
successful community. Few ministers of the
gospel passed up the chance to ask for a free
building lot for a church, and most such requests were granted routinely, although the
lots they were given generally occupied the far
corners of the original plat, where small-town
churches remain to this day. Somewhere
was begun the practice of giving free lots to
newborn babies; these requests, too, were
often granted, however grudgingly, by the
townsite agent. 27 Requests to use unsold lots
(free) for a pasture for the family cow, to place
a temporary building (free) on a salable lot, and
many others were received and frequently
granted. Because townsite proprietors received
little good publicity, they undoubtedly used

FIG. 5. Tall, bare false fronts characterize
northern railroad towns (top: Barton, North
Dakota). Shorter elevations and canopied walks
were built simultaneously in railroad towns of
the South (bottom: Dime Box, Texas).

such opportunities to show that they were
human, too.
Although they donated lots for churches,
schools, courthouses, and other public buildings, proprietors had a blind spot when it came
to- improvements that might make their towns
more livable. Parks, when they were donated
at all, were taken from unsold, and probably
unsalable, marginal land on which the proprietOr wished to avoid further taxes. Requests
to plant trees, gravel the streets, or drain wet
depressions were overlooked unless the public
rose up in anger. Townsite companies had no
legal responsibility to make such improvements,
and they constantly encouraged their towns to
incorporate formally so that such problems
would fall to local governments to solve. Once
a town had gotten its start, company interest
faded quickly as attention shifted to the next
town lot sale somewhere else.
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CONCLUSION

The railroad companies took a restricted
interest in the towns they had created, but the
results of their efforts produced as many unintended effects as intended ones. There can
be no doubt that their townsite strategies discouraged the appearance of other new towns
created by parties other than the railroads.
Only when railroads left the field open to
intruders, and thereby signaled their lack of
interest, did independent townsites fmd a permanent place along the tracks. Had railrCfads
not been primarily interested in controlling
these developments, there undoubtedly would
have been more new towns platted, they would
have fought each other for dominance, and
some would have emerged successfully to grow
into stable communities. In the long run,
however, the changing conditions of retailing
and marketing determined the success of a
trade center.
The unintended effects of railroad townsite
policies made a greater impact on the internal
structure of the communities themselves. First
among these was the leveling effect produced
by the railroads' view that all towns along the
line would perform essentially the same function, that of funneling traffic to the railroad.
This was to be accomplished by setting in place
an up-and-coming business class that would
make a good showing for the town. Railroads
created a highly specialized division of labor
among merchants at the outset by their policies
on lot sizes and sales, which, in turn, encouraged
small proprietorships rather than fewer but
larger business firms.
The railroad actually had a democratizing
influence by making it possible for those with
little capital to start a business, but if the people who entered into these ventures held the
ideals expected of them, they were not likely
to be satisfied with such a state of affairs.
Many were not content, and they soon emerged
as community leaders, pooling their assets,
founding stronger fmancial institutions, buying
out their weaker competitors, building elegant
homes, and generally behaving as merchants

were expected to behave. Towns that witnessed
such developments were seen as aggressive and
healthy, and they were favored by railroad
officials despite the fact that such economic
evolution came about as a way of surviving the
railroad's blueprint for settlement.
Most railroad towns were failures. They did
not have secure enough standing to survive the
technological changes that began making small
towns obsolete after 1920; this was especially
true of the great number of towns founded in
the last wave of American railroad building
between 1905 and 1915. The failure of a town
was blamed on the inhabitants-a judgement
that was justified only to the extent that many
towns did have an identical start. The evidence
of failure, however, was that such towns were
never able to throw off the small-business
mentality that surrounded their creation by the
railroad. They were static, born full grown,
and they withered in a world that was anything
but static. The western railroads thus bear a
heavy burden for the losses suffered by hundreds of thousands who believed what townsite
agents told them about the prospects for a good
life doing business in their town.
Was there an alternative? What might have
happened if federal land policies had played as
significant a role in town building as they did in
farm building? The few examples of government townsites in Oklahoma offer mixed evidence of success. Government townsite laws
were few and they had little impact on the
success of communities. 28 If the railroads had
taken a less active role in creating towns, however, there probably would have been greater
variety from the results of diverse, uncoordinated attempts to build not only trade-center
towns but cities. That, after all, had been the
pattern up to the time that railroads came along.
The outcome might have been an urban geography much different than the West has today.
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